The future NATO concept has raised a lot of interest within the military community. Among those who wrote on the topic, I could find some comments on the reinforcement of the security in Europe thanks the enlargement of the Alliance or its prominent role in world’s stability and security.
This has been true until Warsaw Pact collapsed and afterwards during the instability which succeeded to the fall of Berlin Wall. Since then, as everybody knows, no European country is really threatened at its borders, except in the 90’s in the Balkan area. Of course, many of the European countries still feel threatened by Russia and are eager to feel the US umbrella over their territory.
But this is no more a reality, or at least, with the conventional assets. Most of the US troops hence spread over Germany have now redeployed to the USA, the most symbolic one being may be the 1st infantry division, now based in Fort Riley (Kansas). The US military presence has logically been decreasing for years in order to adapt to the new status of Europe, which does not have any more an immediate and major threat at its border, for the very first time of its history.
Therefore, beyond the political correctness, by which some people insist on the better security in Europe with the enlargement of NATO, one should really look at the added value of the new NATO members. Due to their aging tanks, communication systems, airplanes, ships inherited from the former times, their contribution cannot be regarded as a military one, excepted some infantry or special forces for Afghanistan. Those countries, closer to the Caucasus and Middle East than German Bases offer interesting platforms to US Air Force and other units that are tasked to operate in this area, including missile defence.
The weak military relevance is illustrated by the percentage of those armies in the overall figures of forces in Iraq or Afghanistan. Of course, at the level of those countries, their commitment represents a huge effort, and furthermore, a cultural revolution: in a 10-year time span, they have redirected their troops for a conventional warfare in Europe towards counterinsurgency. The blood shed in those countries implies that they largely deserve US support to their defence. However, the international situation is such that, with the exception of some episodic Russian provocations, they do not risk that much. In any case their situation is not to be compared with Georgia.
In such a situation where the threat is no more at our borders, the military is looking at other directions. One of them could be represented by the rogue states or the failed states. Including this threat in the NATO concept could be interesting: the military has a role, far beyond the borders and furthermore, those countries are not capable of presenting an effective threat against whole NATO. In the worst case, they could initiate one or some localized terrorists attacks. Of course, such attacks would be a tragedy for the victims. Nevertheless, this would not be a vital threat against this very country.
This enemy, formed by this category of rogue or failed states not being a vital issue, I would bet that NATO members would dare to draw all the consequences of the concept. If they would, then they should build up expeditionary forces, in order to be able to address the issue. They are not ready for it, as their only concern is still security at their borders. Why? Because their population do not feel that much involved by overseas adventures. Let’s us look at the firm and definitive German refusal to participate to Eufor in Chad. The Polish participation was more to look at as a visible sign of support to European Defence than a sudden interest for the stability of the former French colony. A further and may be the major issue is the cost of the transformation of their defence forces. They cannot afford it in less than 20 years.
In such an environment, the military relevance of NATO should go on decreasing, and more than a integrated military structure, it should transform towards a coordination body, providing expertise and support to defence forces willing to adapt to the new challenges. One or the other Headquarters would remain to provide this coordination, standardization, and expertise. One or two HQ would remain to command one or the other operation, the rest being disbanded, like the US forces are already doing in Europe.
Identify what elements of the structure (civilian and military) could be reduced would be of course much more difficult: military efficiency being of secondary interest compared with the supposed visibility given by a flag post or the location of a HQ. I prefer to leave this to our politicians.
Showing posts with label OTAN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OTAN. Show all posts
2010-06-05
NATO: the impossible reform of the military capabilities
Thanks O. Kempf and his blog, I could get some insight in Mrs Albright’s report on NATO 2020. Well, the group of experts is really impressive, as they encourage the NATO to do all what it could not achieve in the past 20 years.
Depending on the time available I will try to demonstrate that the reform of the NATO that the group of experts is promoting will surely fail, or at least become reality not earlier than in 2040. When writing ‘reality’, I mean an effective ‘reality’, not the reality of the political statements. That is a different organization, with less headquarters, stronger defence forces within the European countries. In a way, a defence organization which gives our nations the tools to implement their policy.
Although the conclusions of the expert start like the homework of a college student (“the world has changed significantly since 1999”; for sure, it will be of great help to Mr Rasmussen), page after page it becomes more interesting.
For the time being, let us focus on the military capabilities. In a subsequent post, I will look at the political organization.
The main quote I will use is that one: “The primary limiting factor hindering military transformation has been the lack of European defence spending and investment.
Contributing to the problem is the fact that, in the past twenty years, European defence spending has been consumed disproportionally by personnel and operational costs. As a result, European national forces generally do not have nearly enough transformed forces.” (P. 38)
Indeed, I fully disagree with that belief that Europe does not spend enough on defence. In contrary, I support the statement that the money was and is not properly spent. Let us have a look at the defence expenditure of European Union countries (including the UK). Every year, the EU state members spend 200 billion Euros for their defence (Source: EDA). For what result? Out of 1.800.000 soldiers, a maximum of 80.000 is deployed. What the hell the other soldiers are doing all year long? Simply they guard borders that no enemy will cross within the next 20 years, because those very countries will not and will never accept to put down their armies, still largely inherited from Cold War time, and build up lean and expeditionary forces.
A good example is Poland: a few years ago, in 2002, they bought, with a strong US support, F-16. Against whom? Russia? Impossible, the same year, the NATO-Russia Council was set up. Since then, the Polish F-16 have not been deployed yet.
As well, I don not support at all the promotion of Research and Development that is expressed throughout the report: currently, only the USA would take profit out of it through programs like the Joint Strike Fighter, for which only a very few countries, mainly the UK can really get access to the most sensitive data.
Thirdly, regarding current needs in Afghanistan, the NATO asks regularly for more boots on the ground. Well, you do not need high-tech, Robocop style soldiers for those missions. You rather need well-trained troop, ready for patrolling in villages. The issue is that such soldiers do not match with the US technologic approach of military operations.
Therefore, the proposition for a greater effort in R & D or for more versatile and lean defence organizations is not the expression of an operational need. This is the expression of a US desire to see the European build a system, which fits to their own objective, including their industrial development, like in the F-16, the JSF and now the ballistic missile defence.
Depending on the time available I will try to demonstrate that the reform of the NATO that the group of experts is promoting will surely fail, or at least become reality not earlier than in 2040. When writing ‘reality’, I mean an effective ‘reality’, not the reality of the political statements. That is a different organization, with less headquarters, stronger defence forces within the European countries. In a way, a defence organization which gives our nations the tools to implement their policy.
Although the conclusions of the expert start like the homework of a college student (“the world has changed significantly since 1999”; for sure, it will be of great help to Mr Rasmussen), page after page it becomes more interesting.
For the time being, let us focus on the military capabilities. In a subsequent post, I will look at the political organization.
The main quote I will use is that one: “The primary limiting factor hindering military transformation has been the lack of European defence spending and investment.
Contributing to the problem is the fact that, in the past twenty years, European defence spending has been consumed disproportionally by personnel and operational costs. As a result, European national forces generally do not have nearly enough transformed forces.” (P. 38)
Indeed, I fully disagree with that belief that Europe does not spend enough on defence. In contrary, I support the statement that the money was and is not properly spent. Let us have a look at the defence expenditure of European Union countries (including the UK). Every year, the EU state members spend 200 billion Euros for their defence (Source: EDA). For what result? Out of 1.800.000 soldiers, a maximum of 80.000 is deployed. What the hell the other soldiers are doing all year long? Simply they guard borders that no enemy will cross within the next 20 years, because those very countries will not and will never accept to put down their armies, still largely inherited from Cold War time, and build up lean and expeditionary forces.
A good example is Poland: a few years ago, in 2002, they bought, with a strong US support, F-16. Against whom? Russia? Impossible, the same year, the NATO-Russia Council was set up. Since then, the Polish F-16 have not been deployed yet.
As well, I don not support at all the promotion of Research and Development that is expressed throughout the report: currently, only the USA would take profit out of it through programs like the Joint Strike Fighter, for which only a very few countries, mainly the UK can really get access to the most sensitive data.
Thirdly, regarding current needs in Afghanistan, the NATO asks regularly for more boots on the ground. Well, you do not need high-tech, Robocop style soldiers for those missions. You rather need well-trained troop, ready for patrolling in villages. The issue is that such soldiers do not match with the US technologic approach of military operations.
Therefore, the proposition for a greater effort in R & D or for more versatile and lean defence organizations is not the expression of an operational need. This is the expression of a US desire to see the European build a system, which fits to their own objective, including their industrial development, like in the F-16, the JSF and now the ballistic missile defence.
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