Spain and Europe: 25 years of a success story.

As we are now in a period of European crisis, where some people believe that the European idea is near to be dead, I really enjoyed reading the analysis made by Mr Ignacio Molina for the Real Instituto Elcano. For those who read Spanish, this article is to be found here.

Well, Mr Ignacio Molina reminds us all what the European integration brought to Spain to consolidate its economy and, may be even more important, the democracy. One of his references is José Ortega y Gasset that he quotes, stating in 1910, “Spain is the problem and Europe the solution” so that “regeneration cannot be separated from Europeanization”.

Indeed, this Spanish point of view on European integration process is refreshing. I would rather think that the paramount influence of European Union for the successful democratization and pacification of Old Continent societies, like the Spanish one has been largely forgotten among all the historical 6 Members (France, Germany, Benelux and Italy). The idea of purely economical links between our countries can surely fit with the immediate interests of our citizens. However, a project can be built up only over generations, if there is any project.

Having read Mr Molina analysis, I would rather think that Europe is a project for Spain, and not only a process driven by the events or temporary interests. This could be an explanation for the enduring consensus on Europe that spreads over all the relevant political parties and among the public opinion, in which welfare, development, democracy and strengthening of the Nations are considered as being the fruits of European integration.

Finally, I would think that the comfort we are living in since 1945, at least among the 6 founding members, we tend towards forgetting some basic principles, like fragility of democracy and freedom. This is not the best way to handover a to our followers what we inherited from our fathers or grandfathers. Therefore, when some countries are still wondering whether European Defence is dead, I would take as a strong warning the statement of Mr Molina, according whom, Spain, sooner or later would be tempted to play its own role on the international scene, because of the stumbling European external policy. This temptation cannot be fully excluded: Spain has now turned the page of dictatorship since a while and is completely back on the international scene.

As for European Defence or in this case, European interests, refers, this would be painful: the traditional area of Spanish influence, Latin America and area of interest, Mediterranean Sea are both of interest for Europe as well. South America because of it emerging markets, for which we need stability and Mediterranean Sea where the migratory flow of population is all but to stop.

It’s a long way to an EU operational headquarters

The main reference of this post will be fact sheet published by the Real Instituto Elcano (here), which has published on 23 March 2010 a paper written by Luis Simon, dealing with the EU operational headquarters. The paper can be found in Spanish on the Institute website. I really liked reading it, as it gives a good insight of the whole planning process, even if it does not deal with the issues of parallel planning, which permit to compress significantly the time needed for preparing an operation.

Like many other people more or less involved in European Defence, I think that this operational headquarters will be needed. Therefore, I am really happy seeing Luis Simon supporting the idea. However Mr Simon is realistic, when saying that neither Germany nor the UK ever supported the idea. As for the UK refers, nothing new. The fight against this supposed duplication between the NATO and the EU is an ancient issue, when everybody knows that the real duplication lies within the NATO itself. Germany could be more surprising. I am not. The best expression I could read is “destructive ambiguity” (‘ambigüedad destructive). L. Simon attributes this German ambiguity to their civilian perception of operations, in which they reject a pure military approach.

May be, this explanation is to simple, as the Germans do not reject, and in contrary fully support the NATO purely military headquarters. I would rather think that of course the Germans have expressed at this occasion some of their belief that being a nice and peaceful country would be enough to ban war and solve conflicts. One could think as well that the German intend was to copy in the EU their perception of operations (vernetzte Sicherheit) and therefore take an informal leadership, supported by their civilian experience in conflicts, knowing they would not be able to challenge countries like France or the UK on the expeditionary warfare, on which both are much more experienced than the Bundeswehr. In Afghanistan, when the Germans built up the Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz, they applied this integrated civ-mil way of operating while France and the UK were still on more conventional schemes.

Therefore I prefer thinking that they tried to capitalize on their know how (here for more info on PRT Kunduz), instead of being exclusively angelic.

Anyway, L. Simon assesses clearly and rightly that ‘the current planning system and the command and control of CFSP military operations do not fill the minimum quality standards’. Any operation supposed to deploy in a short time need several planning layers working in parallel. The fact is that the current structure in place in Brussels does not permit developing this modus operandi, as something is missing between the strategic (political) and tactical (military technical) levels. The recourse to national operational headquarters is not satisfactory in a EU context, as suspicion of national hidden agendas will always prevail. Furthermore, putting a national operational headquarters at disposal of the EU implies that you declare yourself ready. Who can still imagine that the German operational command in Potsdam could command and control a deployment in Africa, when one see what has happened for Chad, where Germany was politically supporting the operation and militarily refusing it?

Therefore military credibility needs a minimum of assets guaranteeing the possibility to deploy. In that field M. Simon is totally right. Nonetheless, when he proposes the EU situation centre in Brussels to be designated as the ‘preferred HQ’ for CFSP operations, I do not believe it realistic, at least yet, at least as long as every European country thinks that power and influence lie by their capacity to control an EU operation via their national operational headquarters.