When Spain took over its presidency of the EU Council, some six months ago, one could see that its objectives were very limited, but, in a way, realistic. At that time, Spain goals were very limited, but in a way, realistic due to the fact that 6 months are a very short period of time, and that the lack of unity of views between the countries had closed the way to a larger ambition. More concretely, Spain objectives were to realize a qualitative jump in promoting more efficient and flexible EU battle groups, consolidating the association between the EU and the NATO and going forward in the civil-military cooperation.
What was reached?
The financial and budgetary crisis, and the rescue of Greece have diverted our officials from this chapter of European construction. Nothing at all is to be read except some declaration supporting the sanctions against Iran. This is really the minimum of what the European Union could do. Of course, it seems that the EU could go forward on the organization of the external action service of Mrs Ashton. However, the cancellation of both summits EU-USA and Mediterranean Union let assess that the European countries were not attractive enough to make president Obama visit again Europe and make the Mediterranean countries find a way to progress on peace.
Everybody can understand that the Spanish agenda for its presidency has been overwhelmingly influenced by the crisis and the vital need to restore confidence and belief in the economical and financial system. In such situations nobody will claim being neglected.
Therefore, let us see what will happen with the Belgian Presidency, effectively and if the absence of long time government will influence the results that could be reached.
Showing posts with label Spain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spain. Show all posts
2010-07-09
Spain and Europe: 25 years of a success story.
As we are now in a period of European crisis, where some people believe that the European idea is near to be dead, I really enjoyed reading the analysis made by Mr Ignacio Molina for the Real Instituto Elcano. For those who read Spanish, this article is to be found here.
Well, Mr Ignacio Molina reminds us all what the European integration brought to Spain to consolidate its economy and, may be even more important, the democracy. One of his references is José Ortega y Gasset that he quotes, stating in 1910, “Spain is the problem and Europe the solution” so that “regeneration cannot be separated from Europeanization”.
Indeed, this Spanish point of view on European integration process is refreshing. I would rather think that the paramount influence of European Union for the successful democratization and pacification of Old Continent societies, like the Spanish one has been largely forgotten among all the historical 6 Members (France, Germany, Benelux and Italy). The idea of purely economical links between our countries can surely fit with the immediate interests of our citizens. However, a project can be built up only over generations, if there is any project.
Having read Mr Molina analysis, I would rather think that Europe is a project for Spain, and not only a process driven by the events or temporary interests. This could be an explanation for the enduring consensus on Europe that spreads over all the relevant political parties and among the public opinion, in which welfare, development, democracy and strengthening of the Nations are considered as being the fruits of European integration.
Finally, I would think that the comfort we are living in since 1945, at least among the 6 founding members, we tend towards forgetting some basic principles, like fragility of democracy and freedom. This is not the best way to handover a to our followers what we inherited from our fathers or grandfathers. Therefore, when some countries are still wondering whether European Defence is dead, I would take as a strong warning the statement of Mr Molina, according whom, Spain, sooner or later would be tempted to play its own role on the international scene, because of the stumbling European external policy. This temptation cannot be fully excluded: Spain has now turned the page of dictatorship since a while and is completely back on the international scene.
As for European Defence or in this case, European interests, refers, this would be painful: the traditional area of Spanish influence, Latin America and area of interest, Mediterranean Sea are both of interest for Europe as well. South America because of it emerging markets, for which we need stability and Mediterranean Sea where the migratory flow of population is all but to stop.
Well, Mr Ignacio Molina reminds us all what the European integration brought to Spain to consolidate its economy and, may be even more important, the democracy. One of his references is José Ortega y Gasset that he quotes, stating in 1910, “Spain is the problem and Europe the solution” so that “regeneration cannot be separated from Europeanization”.
Indeed, this Spanish point of view on European integration process is refreshing. I would rather think that the paramount influence of European Union for the successful democratization and pacification of Old Continent societies, like the Spanish one has been largely forgotten among all the historical 6 Members (France, Germany, Benelux and Italy). The idea of purely economical links between our countries can surely fit with the immediate interests of our citizens. However, a project can be built up only over generations, if there is any project.
Having read Mr Molina analysis, I would rather think that Europe is a project for Spain, and not only a process driven by the events or temporary interests. This could be an explanation for the enduring consensus on Europe that spreads over all the relevant political parties and among the public opinion, in which welfare, development, democracy and strengthening of the Nations are considered as being the fruits of European integration.
Finally, I would think that the comfort we are living in since 1945, at least among the 6 founding members, we tend towards forgetting some basic principles, like fragility of democracy and freedom. This is not the best way to handover a to our followers what we inherited from our fathers or grandfathers. Therefore, when some countries are still wondering whether European Defence is dead, I would take as a strong warning the statement of Mr Molina, according whom, Spain, sooner or later would be tempted to play its own role on the international scene, because of the stumbling European external policy. This temptation cannot be fully excluded: Spain has now turned the page of dictatorship since a while and is completely back on the international scene.
As for European Defence or in this case, European interests, refers, this would be painful: the traditional area of Spanish influence, Latin America and area of interest, Mediterranean Sea are both of interest for Europe as well. South America because of it emerging markets, for which we need stability and Mediterranean Sea where the migratory flow of population is all but to stop.
2010-05-10
The limited but realistic ambitions of Spanish presidency of the Union.
Recently I have run my eye over the program of the Spanish presidency. The program is available on different languages on presidency’s website (here).
The Spanish ambition in that field, during those six months is the following one: realize a qualitative jump in promoting more efficient and flexible EU battle groups, consolidating the association between the EU and the NATO and going forward in the civil-military cooperation. That’s it.
Frankly a presidency, modest in its goals but remaining in the field of the possible is preferable to an ambitious one in which nobody will believe. Usually those presidencies end up with a declaration aiming at expressing the historical progress made during the last 6 months.
Anyway, even if a great country like Spain focuses on 1,500 man strong units, I do not assess this to be a great success in June. The EU battle groups suffer many weaknesses, already from their conception.
They are intended to provide the EU a quick military response to contingencies, in order to defuse a situation before it worsens. From a military point of view, what is hidden behind the idea of “quick response”?
Usually, when you need such a unit, it has to be:
-Air transportable,
-Multi-faceted, in order to face and overcome any unexpected worsening of the situation.
-Usable, which is the basis, therefore interoperable, trained and able to operate with the same rules of engagement.
-Sustainable. I mean that a battle group is not a one shot tool. Logistics must follow and if necessary reinforcement or replacement.
Le’s now have a closest look at the planning for the battle groups and let us take two examples. May be my data are not up to date. Any contribution will be welcome. I will not focus on the political side of the usability, but only on the military one. The examples I will take are from the second semester 2010 and first semester 2011. One of the battlegroups designated for 2010/2 is composed with Italian, Romanian and Turkish units. From a purely technical point of view, they are alike any other ad hoc coalition. They do not own the same equipment, their command and information systems have limited compatibility and their logistic organizations are independent. Despite the best will of the soldiers engaged in those battlegroups, it couldn’t be otherwise.
-The procurement of equipment is not European, but national, with national budgets. Due to the legitimate preservation of national industry, special partnership with one or the other country, due to the 40 years cycle needed to change the full equipment of an army, the equipment of this battlegroup cannot be homogeneous. Therefore, the planner has to organize the logistic not for one battlegroup, but for three independent units. Going further in details, the various national regulations usually demand a national certification for any equipment or spare part. That means that even if a weapon or any other system is supposed to be compatible with the incoming spare part, we are not certain of having the right to make use of those same foreign parts or ammunition.
-The command and information systems are usually built up as well on national criteria and because of national sovereignty, the cryptology remains purely national. In NATO operations, NATO will provide all the CIS assets down to headquarters level below the lowest NATO command level, in order they can communicate with the higher echelon. As the EU does not own such agencies able to equip headquarters, one must rely on the assets of one of the framework nations. During the operation in Chad, the EU could apply the same policy than NATO. However, the EU had more than one-year time between the decision to deploy and the effective presence there. In case of quick deployment, I do not know who would guarantee the CIS.
From a more political point of view, some battlegroups are simply not credible. Looking at the Helbroc (Greek, Romanian, Bulgarian, Cypriot battlegroup, what are their projection and logistic capacities? Those are armies have never deployed abroad in a single national operation. The Nordic battlegroup is for sure the most powerful and best trained. However, who would believe that countries like Sweden or Ireland would commit themselves in robust operations, while they claim neutrality and refuse, like Ireland, any binding alliance?
Therefore I fear that the Spanish presidency ambition as for defence refers will remain an ambition and not a realization, despite all efforts: as long as the issues of interoperability and political intention to go forward will not have been addressed, nothing will really happen.
The Spanish ambition in that field, during those six months is the following one: realize a qualitative jump in promoting more efficient and flexible EU battle groups, consolidating the association between the EU and the NATO and going forward in the civil-military cooperation. That’s it.
Frankly a presidency, modest in its goals but remaining in the field of the possible is preferable to an ambitious one in which nobody will believe. Usually those presidencies end up with a declaration aiming at expressing the historical progress made during the last 6 months.
Anyway, even if a great country like Spain focuses on 1,500 man strong units, I do not assess this to be a great success in June. The EU battle groups suffer many weaknesses, already from their conception.
They are intended to provide the EU a quick military response to contingencies, in order to defuse a situation before it worsens. From a military point of view, what is hidden behind the idea of “quick response”?
Usually, when you need such a unit, it has to be:
-Air transportable,
-Multi-faceted, in order to face and overcome any unexpected worsening of the situation.
-Usable, which is the basis, therefore interoperable, trained and able to operate with the same rules of engagement.
-Sustainable. I mean that a battle group is not a one shot tool. Logistics must follow and if necessary reinforcement or replacement.
Le’s now have a closest look at the planning for the battle groups and let us take two examples. May be my data are not up to date. Any contribution will be welcome. I will not focus on the political side of the usability, but only on the military one. The examples I will take are from the second semester 2010 and first semester 2011. One of the battlegroups designated for 2010/2 is composed with Italian, Romanian and Turkish units. From a purely technical point of view, they are alike any other ad hoc coalition. They do not own the same equipment, their command and information systems have limited compatibility and their logistic organizations are independent. Despite the best will of the soldiers engaged in those battlegroups, it couldn’t be otherwise.
-The procurement of equipment is not European, but national, with national budgets. Due to the legitimate preservation of national industry, special partnership with one or the other country, due to the 40 years cycle needed to change the full equipment of an army, the equipment of this battlegroup cannot be homogeneous. Therefore, the planner has to organize the logistic not for one battlegroup, but for three independent units. Going further in details, the various national regulations usually demand a national certification for any equipment or spare part. That means that even if a weapon or any other system is supposed to be compatible with the incoming spare part, we are not certain of having the right to make use of those same foreign parts or ammunition.
-The command and information systems are usually built up as well on national criteria and because of national sovereignty, the cryptology remains purely national. In NATO operations, NATO will provide all the CIS assets down to headquarters level below the lowest NATO command level, in order they can communicate with the higher echelon. As the EU does not own such agencies able to equip headquarters, one must rely on the assets of one of the framework nations. During the operation in Chad, the EU could apply the same policy than NATO. However, the EU had more than one-year time between the decision to deploy and the effective presence there. In case of quick deployment, I do not know who would guarantee the CIS.
From a more political point of view, some battlegroups are simply not credible. Looking at the Helbroc (Greek, Romanian, Bulgarian, Cypriot battlegroup, what are their projection and logistic capacities? Those are armies have never deployed abroad in a single national operation. The Nordic battlegroup is for sure the most powerful and best trained. However, who would believe that countries like Sweden or Ireland would commit themselves in robust operations, while they claim neutrality and refuse, like Ireland, any binding alliance?
Therefore I fear that the Spanish presidency ambition as for defence refers will remain an ambition and not a realization, despite all efforts: as long as the issues of interoperability and political intention to go forward will not have been addressed, nothing will really happen.
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